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Toward a Genealogy of Aryan Morality: Nietzsche and Jacolliot
Thomas Paul Bonfiglio While Nietzsche's writings of the late 1880s reveal waxing interests in Hinduism, Sanskrit philology, Aryan culture, and the related Indo-European hypothesis, these interests have been remarkably understudied by Nietzsche scholarship, with the exception of a scant few articles that have recently appeared. 1 The presence of the aforementioned topics was crucial for the configuration of the works written in 1887 and 1888: On the Genealogy of Morality, The
Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist, as well as for some of the notions at hand in Nietzsche's correspondence with Heinrich Köselitz, but the provenance of the ideas that codetermined those works and generated their philosophies has never been properly examined. It is imperative to analyze and interpret Nietzsche's sources and his reception and development of them, in order to better understand the texts of one of the most complex and innovative philosophers of the nineteenth century. This study is itself a genealogy that offers an account of the etiology of some of the highly salient and fundamental aspects of Nietzsche's work of the period in question, such as the concepts of Jewish and Christian morality and psychology, Aryan ideology, miscegenation, the caste system, and the figure of the outcast (Chandala), as well as the idea of the human as the measurer, which also offers a curious epistemological excursus on the nature of human thought.
There are several factors that recommend that this study be both philosophical and philological in orientation. First, the ideologies present in the material studied here themselves arise from Nietzsche's philological inquiries. It was the milieu of modern comparative historical linguistics, which originated in Germany in the nineteenth century, that provided the context for 2 the development of Nietzsche's ideas as examined here. This milieu was ridden with romantic notions of the prehistoric origins of European "race," language, and culture, and it was Nietzsche's own interest in those romantic accounts and in comparative philology that motivated the construction of some of the ideologies present in his later works. It is within the matrix of philology and philosophy that these ideas arose in a codeterminative, symbiotic relationship; in short, one may posit the birth of Aryan morality from the spirit of nineteenth century historical linguistics. It was Glen Most, who recently, and in these very pages, lamented the dearth of scholarship on Nietzsche's philological writings, observing that they had "suffered a bleak existence in a remote corner of the history of philosophy and culture." 2 Most reminds us that, in order to properly historicize the philosophy of Nietzsche, scholarship must not lose sight of the fact "that philology in the decades before Nietzsche's birth occupied somewhat the same position in the German academic landscape that genetic research does now." 3 Here, the comparison with genetics is an auspicious one, as it underscores the genealogical models of inquiry common to both disciplines, models both performed and consciously problematized by Nietzsche.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the ideas of Nietzsche studied here are those of a philosophy of and in language, for Nietzsche himself was among the first to discuss the (post)modern notions of linguistic relativity and of the ineluctability of language in thought, problems that occupied subsequent thinkers from Benjamin Whorf to the French poststructuralists. Nietzsche's primacy in the poststructuralist discourse of the late twentieth century-the discourse that relativizes and subsumes knowledge to textual language-is underscored by the fact that his essay "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense" (1873)
became so frequently employed in poststructuralist circles, that it won the informal designation of "the Yale essay." Jews seem, here as well, to be simply "imitators"-they invent nothing. 13 (KGB 3/5, 325)
Nietzsche first frames this French translation of the Mānavadharmaçāstra as one of lofty origin, having been supervised by highly educated Brahmans. It is a lawbook that is not only Aryan, but absolutely Aryan, and it is also a moral code that justifies the existence of a caste system.
Nietzsche sees it as doing so non-pessimistically, that is, in an affirmative manner that only seeks to codify a system that is already in place, and not in reaction against incipient decline in an effort to insure the system against degeneration. It is thus organizational but not reactionary, while its medieval European permutation, meaning the caste system of the middle ages, enforces its own social structure in a pessimistic fashion, that is, in an act of self-preservation and in the face of the decline of the heroic nobility and the ascent of the slave mentality. Nietzsche also presents the code of Manu as being of ancient lineage, if not of ultimate anteriority and thus originality. It is the source for all derivative moralities: Egyptian, Platonic, Jewish, and Chinese.
Thus here, Nietzsche does not seem to be exempt from the influence of the romantic orientalism of the nineteenth century that sought to locate the origins of European culture in Hinduism and in the Sanskrit language, an ideology that operated on a distinctly racial axis. It is interesting to note 8 the implicit etiology present in Nietzsche's discourse. It is as if a romantic notion of an original point were at work, or better at play here, in an almost biblical fashion. Manu is the first human, an Adamic figure, who must also of necessity be Aryan. Moreover, India is depicted as a kind of point of dispersion not only for political, but also for philosophical, cultural, religious, and moral systems as well. For Nietzsche, the subaltern nature of Jewish origin excludes Jews from creativity; they remain middlemen.
It is most interesting to see how Nietzsche situates Jews in this context: he refers to them as a "race of Chandalas" (Tschandala-Rasse), a concept gleaned from his readings of Jacolliot.
The term originates in the Sanskrit candāla, which refers to the lowest class of India, the outcasts or untouchables, who actually occupied a status below that of the four formal castes of brahma (sacerdotal), ksatriya (nobility), vaiśya (farmer or merchant), and śūdra (slave). A child of a brahma father and a śūdra mother, a candāla was considered to be the lowest of humans. 14 The word literally means "the worst among," and is from the root canda, meaning "fierce," "violent,"
or "cruel." The candāla were literally "out-cast," in the sense of being so low as to be outside of the caste system itself.
While Nietzsche correctly understands the caste divisions, as indicated in The Twilight of the Idols: "The task here is to raise no less than four races at once: a sacerdotal, a military, a commercial-agricultural, and finally a race of servants, the Sudras," 15 and Jacolliot does, as well:
"The fours castes are: the Brahmans, or priests; the Kshatria, or kings; the Vaisias, or merchants and farmers; the Sudras, or slaves," 16 both prefer to see a rigidity and inflexibility in the Indian caste system that guards against cross-caste intermarriage and preserves an Aryan "purity,"
especially in the upper caste of Brahman. Moreover, both seem to be unaware that the caste system was a later development in the history of Hinduism. In the early Vedic period, there is no 9 evidence of a caste system or of any restrictions on inter-ethnic marriage at all. 17 The caste system itself was a later development and tended to solidify when Muslims started settling in northern India in the seventh century. 18 Thus its provenance is not endogenous, but instead precipitated by the external incursions that threatened the political and economic integrity of India.
The traditional Hindu system divided the śūdra off from the other three castes, distinguishing brahma, ksatriya, and vaiśya as twice-born and the śūdra as only born once.
While Hinduism did develop very complicated rules on all forms of intercourse among members of different castes and came to discourage inter-caste marriage in general, it was most condemnatory of marriage between brahma and śūdra, and it was this union that produced the candāla. Jacolliot, however, misunderstands the candāla as the offspring of any inter-caste marriage, referring to them as the people of "des classes mêlées" (99). Jacolliot's choice of the Is intellectualism (Geistigkeit) natural and affirmative, or does this intellectualism deny (as is presumably the case with the "priests" of Judaism and Christianity) this very naturalness, the world? The Antichrist's answer to this question sounds contradictory, so that one cannot ultimately decide if the new morality of "the few"-along with its confessional "asceticism"-is life-affirming or hostile to life itself. The only way out of this trap is benevolently to take the skeptical metastandpoint von #54 and hold isostheny to be the most essential … intellectuality would then be in principle neither life-affirming nor life-negating. 22 Granting intellectualism a neutral value thus enables Nietzsche to maintain his perception of the superiority and originality of Indian thought and recover sources antecedent to those of the western tradition. Having read Deussen's translations of the Sutras, 23 and was able to preserve the lawbooks in all their purity." 29 In the north, however, "customs became changed by contact abroad, and under the harsh law of the Koran." 30 He speaks of "the criticism leveled by the pundits of the south against the Brahmans of the north for having altered the sacred texts." 31 Thus Jacolliot sought a version of the Mānavadharmaçāstra from the south of India, because it would be farther away from the Arabs, and thus, in his opinion, "purer." It is 13 indeed odd that Jacolliot, such a fervent participant in the racial ideologies of late nineteenth century Europe, would descend into southern India to seek such a manuscript, as the south has the highest concentration of non-Aryan aboriginal Dravidians, who would be seen, in the race conscious paradigm of that era, as even more removed from Indo-Europeans than the Arabs who were threatening the north.
In a volley of inductive leaps based on the most minimal of correspondences, Jacolliot then tries to show that all civilization as we know it has its source in India, has been inherited by Aryans, and either copied or corrupted by Semites. In his annotations on the figure of Narayana, "or he who moves on the waters," 32 he says, "Unconscious copyist; all the author of Genesis did was copy the Hindu and Chaldean traditions." 33 In the figure of Naya, the spirit that is divided into separate male and female parts, he sees the source of "the legend of woman from the side of man." 34 On the Hindu tradition of anointing with holy oil, he says, "The texts of these ceremonies were copied by Christianity." 35 He has a similar view on the origin of the practice of shaving the head: "All priests of the far east had tonsures already at a young age … this sign of the sacerdotal caste, preserved over the ages, became a Christian symbol." 36 On the custom of facing east while eating, he says, "Mohammed was inspired by these principles." 37 On the practice of wiping the mouth with the thumb, he says, "Catholicism has preserved these practices in certain ceremonies." 38 For Jacolliot, the Bible is simply a "code of pillage and debauchery." The results of these forced hygienic measures were considerable: deadly epidemics, horrible sexual diseases and, moreover, "the law of the knife,"
ordering circumcision for male children and the removal of the labia for female It is interesting to note here how Nietzsche foregrounds the figure of circumcision, referring to it as "the law of the knife" (das Gesetz des Messers). It serves as a symbolic castration and disempowerment of the lowest class. The elements of disempowerment are crucial to Nietzsche's project, which is to arrive at a hierarchic ontology, one that justifies a discourse of power and sees a caste system as crucial to the nature and emergence of the noble morality. Thus he seeks to conclude, in The Antichrist, that "the order of the castes, the highest, dominating law, is but the sanctioning of a natural order, of a natural legality of the highest rank, over which no arbitrariness, no 'modern idea' has any power" 49 (KGW 6/3, 240). This is the ultimate locus of power that necessitates the maintenance and deployment of that very power. In The Twilight of the Idols, he says, "But even this organization had need to be dreadful,-not, in this case, in 16 battle with the beast, but instead with its opposite concept, the human of no breeding, the human mishmash, the Chandala" 50 (KGW 6/3, 94).
One also sees here the presence of Jacolliot's discussion of the prescriptions on writing.
Jacolliot says, "We are the people of the right hand, which means that we come from the high There are also other similarities to be found between Jacolliot's ideas and those expressed by Nietzsche in the Genealogy that could support the speculation that Nietzsche may have indeed been familiar with Jacolliot's work earlier than previously thought. For instance, the following supposition by Jacolliot about the candāla displays some curious similarities to Nietzsche's ideas on the slave mentality:
This class had no legal existence at all … like all races abandoned to the life of nature, the Chandala developed with extraordinary rapidity. Originating from the criminals of all the castes, even the castes of Brahmans and Kshatriyas, they wasted no time in forming a group that was a lot more intelligent and skillful than the average Sudra or even Vaisia. Nietzsche is engaged here in false etymology and seems to be conflating several Sanskrit words at once when he invokes "manas" and represents it a signifying the human as the measuring animal. The words are: manah "mind," manu "human," √mā "to measure," and √man "to think."
Manah, manu, and √man are all three certainly root-related, and their cognates include Latin mens, English "to mean" and "man," and German meinen, Mann, and Mensch. While the nuclear form to all is indeed the verb root √man, the great nineteenth century Sanskritist Charles Lanman advises as such: "The derivation of manu from √man, 'think,' is unobjectionable so far as the form goes, but the usual explanation of manu as 'the thinker' defies common sense." 66 The name
Manu itself is also clearly related here, a correspondence one might have expected Nietzsche to exploit, given his inclination to explain by associative etymology. But √mā is a separate root altogether, and its cognates include Latin manus, "hand," mater, "mother," and English "mother," as well. Nietzsche commits the same conflation in Human, All Too Human: "The human as the measurer. -Perhaps all human morality has its origin in the immense inner excitement that gripped the first humans as they discovered measure and measuring, scale and weighing (the word 'man' means the measuring one, he wanted to name himself after his greatest discovery!)" 67 (KGW 6/3, 192) . In misunderstanding the human as the measurer-thinker, Nietzsche is suggesting that the act of cognition itself is a measurement or estimation of self against other; ergo, a form of class or caste consciousness must lie at the root of human culture.
Thus, by analogy, the Indian caste system is simply a manifestation of the natural order of things, 21 the "sanctioning of a natural order" (Sanktion einer Natur-Ordnung). It is also important to note that the indicated relationship between "lender and debtor" (Gläubiger und Schuldner) presented in the passage above necessitates that the subjugated class feel guilty for its debt (schuldig for its Schuld(en), as in the meanings of the Latin debita), thus effecting the guilt complex of the subaltern, an idea recognizable to those familiar with the arguments in the Genealogy.
Thus one sees in Nietzsche a quite curious genealogy of Aryan morality: the ideologies of a "race of Chandalas" marked by circumcision and responsible for the generation of Jewish and
Christian morals, of a caste system and the necessity of suppression as original to human culture, of miscegenation, and of India as an original point for western idealism are all codetermined by the reception of the work of a race conscious fabulist disregarded by contemporary scholarship.
In addition, the genesis of the idea of the human as the measurer stems from etymological misanalyses of Sanskrit terms, which misanalyses aided Nietzsche in the construction of an epistemology that accepts a priori a perception of social difference and, ultimately, stratification; this epistemology also facilitated the ideology of caste and hierarchy. It has long been known that Nietzsche was well acquainted with several prominent indologists, among them Paul Deussen, Max Müller, and Ernst Windisch, who could have ameliorated many of the errors and fanciful etymologies associated with his reception of Jacolliot. Perhaps Ahlsdorf's terse summation in Nietzsches Juden, neatly formulated in a noncommittal German subjunctive, is to the point: "Nietzsche's credulous acceptance of these curious theses, as well as his own comments on them, might be dismissed as a sign of his approaching mental collapse." 68 22
